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Essay: Power and Presumptions; Rules and
Rhetoric; Institutions and Indian Law*
Deborah A. GeierI.

INTRODUCTION

"Pequot Indians' Casino Wealth Extends the Reach of
Tribal Law,"' the headline read. The article described how the
Mashantucket Pequots, a tiny Connecticut tribe, has enacted
new laws and expanded its court system with the newly
acquired wealth realized from the operation of its Foxwood
Casino in Ledyard, Connecticut. 'The point of all this, tribal
officials say, is not the law for its own sake, but rather what
the ability to make and enforce laws implies: authority,
independence and sovereignty."2
Precisely what laws are within a tribe's sovereign power to
enact and enforce within the boundaries of Indian country' is
COPYRIGHT 1994 DEBORAH A. GEIER
Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland
State University. J.D., 1986, Case Western Reserve School of Law; A.B., 1983
Baldwin-Wallace College. I thank Professor Gregory Mark for his helpful comments
on an earlier draft as well as Eric Spade for his research assistance.
I think it particularly appropriate that this piece is published in the BYU Law
Review. My interest in Indian law was sparked during my clerkship with the
Honorable Monroe G. McKay of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, who was a
member of the BYU faculty when named to the federal bench. Indian law issues
remain close to his heart, and his enthusiasm for the area was infectious. That is
not to say, however, that he would agree with parts--or even any-of what is
written here.
1. Kirk Johnson, Pequot Inlians' Casino Wealth Extends the Reach of Tribal
Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1994, at 1.
2. Id. at 32.
3. "Indian country" is a term of art in Indian law. Originally an undefined
term appearing in early statutes and interpreted in a series of Supreme Court
opinions, the term was most recently statutorily defined in 1948. In that definition,
Congress adopted much of the eommon law that had developed. Included within
the term are Indian reservations, including fee-patented lands within a reservation,
as well as "dependent Indian communities" and allotments held by individual
Indians, wherever located. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988); infra note 12 (describing
allotments). While the statutory definition appears within a statute dealing only
with criminal jurisdiction, the definition has been applied generally to questions of
civil jurisdiction as well. See. e-g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation,
*

**

452

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1994

not a simple question. The intimately related question-what
laws are within a state's sovereign power to enact and enforce
within the boundaries of Indian country within a state-is
equally thorny.
In general, "sovereignty" means the political power to
govern a people in a geographic territory through the rule of
law. The "sovereignty" exercised by Indian tribes in this
country is not so easily defined. The Constitution does not
define it; instead, it is defined by an ever-evolving patchwork of
treaties, statutes, and, most notably in the modern era,
Supreme Court common-law decisions that allocate political
power among the federal government, states, and tribes. Its
contours thus remain fluid instead of fixed, ambiguous instead
of clear.
Many commentators have critiqued the substance of tribal
sovereignty that has emerged from the panoply of statutes and
Supreme Court decisions.4 Intimately related to substance,
however, is the process creating the substance, and I seek
rather to focus on that process. The precise contours and
content of tribal sovereignty today are inevitably a function of
the decision-making process that defines it, and I argue that
the process through which the concept of tribal sovereignty is
given meaning today is fundamentally flawed.
I first describe the institutional process by which tribal
sovereignty is defined. Though the Supreme Court has decided
that Congress possesses plenary power to define tribal
sovereignty, the Court has assumed a pivotal role in the
modern era of defining tribal sovereignty in those large areas
in which Congress has failed to speak. When the Supreme
Court is the decision-maker, its decision-making process has
two components that need to be teased out: the institutional
component of that process (the unique relationship between
Congress and the Supreme Court in this context) and the
rhetorical component of the process (the language used in

113 S. Ct. 1985, 1991 (1993) (citing the definition of Indian country in § 1151 in a
civil tax case); DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975)
("While § 1151 is concerned, on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the Court
has recognized that it generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction.");
see also FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 27-46 (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN].
4. See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based [sic] and Membership.
Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision,
55 U. PIT. L. REV. 1 (1993).
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Supreme Court decisions in which tribal sovereignty is shaped).
I show how each of these components feeds upon the other in a
circularity peculiar to Indian law. The Court's language and
rhetorical devices in deciding the contours of tribal sovereignty
in these common-law cases invoke Congress as the institution
responsible for the case's outcome. That circularity produces
two ill effects: It clouds the institutional responsibility for the
decision, and it allows the Court to avoid discussing openly,
explicitly, and coherently the real heart of the matter-what
tribal sovereignty should be.
I argue that the Supreme Court has implicitly used a
specific rhetorical device in its common-law decisions to shape
the substance of tribal sovereignty, in part to avoid the difficult
inquiries inherent in a frank and full discussion of tribal
sovereignty. Richard H. Gaskins calls this rhetorical device the
"argument-from-ignorance,"
which employs the use of
presumptions and burdens of proof to define substance in the
face of indeterminacy. This use of presumptions and burdens of
proof is different from the more traditional use of these devices
as benign expedients in the evidentiary process. The use of the
"argument-from-ignorance" in the Supreme Court's Indian law
jurisprudence also allows a third ill effect into the process: The
Court can and does fundamentally change the substantive law
without appearing to do so. Without the appearance of change,
the Court's opinions need not proffer any defense or rationale
for the change. The balance of power in Indian country can
thus be shifted dramatically without explicit and reasoned
justifications solely through switching the presumptions
underlying the outcome.
To illustrate, I trace the common-law presumptions in
place before 1989 that favored tribal power over state power in
the civil regulatory context when transactions occurred in
Indian country and were intimately related to the land, the
geographic component of sovereignty. I then expose the
fundamental, yet implicit, change in the Supreme Court's
threshold presumptions when analyzing the scope of tribal
sovereignty in civil regulatory jurisdiction. This change occured
in two 1989 cases: Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico6 and

5. RicHARD 17L GASKINS, BURDENS OF PROOF IN MODERN DIScOURSE (1992).

Though he does not address the use of the device in Indian law, I believe the
material that follows shows how well the shoe fits.
6. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
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Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation.' Cotton Petroleum dealt with the sphere of state
regulatory power in Indian country over non-Indians, and
Brendale dealt with the sphere of tribal regulatory power in
Indian country over non-Indians. Both dealt with issues and
transactions closely tied to the land. The clash between tribal
and state sovereignty in the area of civil regulatory
jurisdiction-including the power to tax, to regulate the
environment, and to regulate land use-is a prime issue as we
enter the next century.8 Thus, the impact of those two cases
and the presumptions they memorialize is far-reaching.
Contrary to stated federal policy, the Supreme Court shifted
power from tribal governments to states in these two landrelated cases, and it did so by reversing the implicit
presumptions used by the Court in delineating the boundaries
between state and tribal power.
I can offer no easy answers to solve the problems of process
described here. Though I offer some thoughts in that direction,
my prime purpose is to make explicit both the weaknesses of
the current decision-making apparatus-the process-and the
inexorable and negative impact that this flawed process has on
the coherent and conscious development of the substance of the
law regarding the scope and content of tribal sovereignty.

7. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
8. President Clinton has indicated support for tribal sovereignty. See
Memorandum of April 29, 1994, Government-to-Government Relations with Native
American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (1994) ("1 am strongly
committed to building a more effective day-to-day working relationship reflecting
respect for the rights of self-government due the sovereign tribal governments.").
Yet, the real tension today lies between the state and tribes in their desire to tax
and regulate in Indian country. Unless the President's views are translated into
legislation favoring tribal power over state power in this context, the resolution of
this tension will continue to be in the hands of the Supreme Court, as described
more fully in Part II.

451]
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WHO DECIDES THE MEANING OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY?

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution confers
upon Congress the power "to regulate commerce ...

with the

Indian tribes." Perhaps combined with the war power and
treaty power, the Indian Commerce Clause has been construed
by the Supreme Court as vesting "plenary power" in Congress
to regulate Indian tribes and their land. The power of Congress

to recognize, develop, or even destroy the political status of
tribes is today unquestioned by the Court, though by no means
unquestioned by academics.9 As phrased by the Court, "The
sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and
limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress

and is subject to complete defeasance." ° As one commentator
has phrased it, the tribes possess only "sovereignty of
sufferance, oxymoronic on its face.""1 Virtually no action taken
by Congress-even "termination" of the special trust

relationship between a tribe and the federal government,
resulting in effective "termination" of the political power of the

9. Two of the best and often-cited discussions of the plenary-power doctrine
are Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984), and Miner S. Ball, Constitution. Court.
Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 3, 46-59. For an illuminating colloquy
on the virtues and vices of the plenary-power doctrine, see Robert Laurence,
Learning to Live With the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30
ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1988); Robert Laurence, On Eurocentric Myopia. the Designated
Hitter Rule and "The Actual State of Things,' 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 459 (1988); Robert
A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Mans Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis.
L. REV. 219; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live With Eurocentric
Myopia, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439 (1988).
10. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313. 323 (1978). This phrase was
quoted approvingly in Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 719 (1983), and Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 699 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Rice, the last clause
was italicized for emphasis.
11. Frank Pommersheim, A Path Near tMe Clearing: An Essay on
ConstitutionalAdjudication in Tribal Courts, 27 GONz. L. Rev. 393, 409 (1992).
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tribe' 2 -has been held by the Court to be unlawful as outside

12. The "termination era" embodied hut one of the several pendulum swings
between the extremes of assimilation on the one hand and the promotion of tribal
sovereignty on the other in the last two centuries. The following brief synopsis is
extracted from DAVID H. GorCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 83-285 (3d ad.
1993).
The removal era, generally 1830 to 1850, saw the forced migration of tribes to
a vast unorganized territory west of the Mississippi that came to be known as
"Indian Territory." Around 1850, with white hunger for land pressing westward,
the reservation system as we now think of it evolved. Even these reservations
proved to be too tempting for land-hungry whites, however, leading to the
allotment era.
The practice of allotment began with tribe-specific statutes that broke up the
tribally owned reservation, awarded individual plots of land to Indians, and opened
up huge tracts of remaining reservation land to white settlers. The practice finally
led to the enactment in 1887 of the General Allotment Act, known as the Dawes
Act, which formalized the policy of assimilation for all tribes. The policy was
supported by an unusual coalition of those in the western portion of the country
who desired the land and those easterners who believed that it was their duty to
christianize and civilize the Indians, a task that they considered could not be
accomplished until tribalism was destroyed and assimilation of Indians into the
mainstream culture achieved.
The allotment program was a miserable failure, resulting in a pendulum swing
in Indian policy with the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. It halted the further
allotment of Indian land, provided a mechanism to reacquire some lost land, and
established a mechanism for tribes to adopt self-governance on Indian reservations.
"The purpose [of the Act] was to promote tribal sovereignty and to stop the
disintegration of the Indian land mass, which decreased from 138 million acres
prior to the allotment program to 48 million acres." Deborah A. Geier,
Commentary: Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445, 450 n.32 (1993).
The pendulum swung back to assimilation in the early 1950s. Perhaps
tribalism was seen to be too close to communism to be comfortable, or perhaps
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), had an inchoate effect on
Indian policy. See Erik M. Jensen, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native
Societies in a Modern Constitutional Democracy, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 318, 327
(1987) (reviewing book of same title by Charles F. Wilkinson); Erik M. Jenson,
Monroe G. McKay and American Indian Law: In Honor of Judge McKay's Tenth
Anniversary on the Federal Bench, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1103 (both pieces seeking a
philosophical justification consistent with the moral principles of Brown for the
Indian policy of measured separatism). In any event, the era of "termination and
relocation" resulted in the termination of the special trust relationship between the
federal government and several tribes and the relocation of Indians of other tribes,
through the enticement of cash grants, from reservations to certain urban centers.
The
next
pendulum
swing
in
Indian
policy-that
toward
"selfdetermination"-came in the 1960s and remains extant as the official federal
policy. An explicit, though admittedly often unfulfilled, policy of each Congress in
the last 30 years has been the strengthening of tribal governments, the protection
of tribal culture, the encouragement of tribal economic self-sufficiency, and the
promotion of tribal self-determination or autonomy. See, e.g., Indian Financing Act
of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451-1534 (1988); Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1988). Cf. Statement on Indian
Policy, PUB. PAPERS 96 (Jan. 24, 1983) (recounting President Reagan's pledge to
"assist tribes in strengthening their governments by removing federal impediments
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of the power of Congress.' 3
Congress therefore possesses the authority to define the
explicit lines between the extent and scope of state power in
Indian country, the extent and scope of tribal power over
nonmembers in Indian country, and the extent and scope of
federal power in Indian country. In a patchwork of statutes
covering specific matters, such as criminal jurisdiction,
Congress sometimes does draw explicit lines.' 4 When the
Court is then presented with a dispute that involves one of
these statutes, each Justice's approach to the issue reflects his
or her approach to statutory interpretation in general. Canons
of statutory and treaty interpretation favor resolving
ambiguities in favor of the Indians,"5 but in general,
principles of Indian law statutory interpretation are merely a
subset of the larger and more familiar body of principles
governing standard statutory interpretation."5 Thus,
disagreements among the Justices regarding interpretation of
Indian statutory law stem from basic disagreements regarding
fundamental rules of statutory interpretation, for example

to tribal self-government and tribal resource development").
13. "The Court has never held a congressional exercise of power over Indian
tribes to be illegal, and there is no reason to think it ever will." Ball, supra note
9, at 12.
Only positive constitutional commands that apply to all, such as the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, appear to constrain the manner in which Congress
exercises its plenary power in the field of Indian law. See United States v. Sioux
Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 407-24 (1980) (holding that although Congress can abrogate
Indian treaties unilaterally by taking land in contravention of a treaty, such taking
is subject to the just-compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment). But see TeeHit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 288-91 (1955) (holding the taking
of land held under "aboriginal title," i.e., land that was never formally set aside by
treaty or statute for the natives, does not require compensation under the Fifth
Amendment).
14. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1162 (1988), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322 (1988), 28
U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)) [hereinafter Public Law 280] (specifying that some states
must and others may assume criminal and civil jurisdiction in Indian country);
Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988) (providing for federal
jurisdiction over certain crimes in Indian country); Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (1988) (providing for federal jurisdiction over certain crimes in Indian
country).
15. See GErCHES, supra note 12, at 345-48.
16. But see David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation:
Conquest, Consent. and Community in Federal Indian Low, 80 VA. L. REV. 403,
405 (1994) ("Because they fail to address the tribes' unique histories, general
theories of statutory interpretation offer little help in constructing a theory of
interpretation for federal Indian statutes.").
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whether or not to consult extra-textual tools to glean the
meaning of a statute.
That situation-when there is a specific and detailed
statute that explicitly purports to resolve the dispute before the
Court-is not what this Essay addresses. 7 Many disputes
that come before the Court present a question regarding the
line between state and tribal power that is not squarely
addressed by any statute, let alone answered. There may be
general treaty terms, perhaps a statute dealing with the
general subject matter though not one squarely applicable, but
there is no source of law that directly purports to answer the
question of, for example, whether an Indian living and working
on a reservation is subject to a state income tax.' " As the
Court must resolve the dispute before it, what is its role as
"gap filler" in these instances?
The Court has created a vast body of Indian common
law 9 to resolve these disputes, any decision of which could be
overturned by Congress under its plenary power over Indian
affairs. While Congress does occasionally reverse or modify the
outcomes of these common-law cases,2" it seems in the past to
have been generally content with letting the Supreme Court
craft, through the common law, the boundaries between state
and tribal power not specifically addressed by statute. There is
no powerful and vocal constituency in Congress to solidify and
expand tribal power and to limit state power in Indian country,

17. A recent example of such an Indian law case that demonstrates both tho
usual tensions in statutory interpretation as well as the recent tendency to rule
against the Indians is County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992). For a discussion of the case within
the context of Justice Scalia's brand of textualism, see Geier, supra note 12, at 460
n.32. See generally Philip P. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, Practical Reasoning, and
the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1990)
(discussing statutory cases as well as common-law cases).
18. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (holding
that McClanahan's wages were not subject to state income taxation).
19. By "Indian law," I generally mean the "body of jurisprudence . . . defining
and implementing the relationship among the United States, Indian tribes .
and the states." COHEN, supra note 3, at 1.
20. For example, Congress overturned the result in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.
676 (1990), which held that a tribe possesses no criminal jurisdiction over Indians
who are not enrolled members of the tribe. Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646
(1991). Similarly, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2702-2721 (1988), which allows but regulates Indian gambling activities, in
response to the Court's decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
480 U.S. 202 (1987), which confirmed the right of the tribes in the case to engage
in reservation gambling activities free of state regulation.
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not uncommon outcomes of pre-1989 Indian law court cases.

Congress might have wished to let the Court do what might be
difficult to accomplish on Capitol Hill in view of the power of
the numerous states that contain reservations-states whose
interests in Indian affairs are often inimical to the expansion of
tribal power at the expense of state power-and the lack of a
countervailing power in the tribal constituency.
As more fully traced in Part III, the rhetorical device
underlying these common law decisions in the modern era is
the use of presumptions in the face of indeterminacy.
Presumptions and burdens of proof in the law have long
been perceived as merely mundane matters of evidence and
procedure, affecting substantive outcomes, surely, but not
depending upon the substance of particular disputes for their
legitimacy. Presumptions and burdens of proof, whether
legislative in origin or judge-made, have been viewed as fairly
innocuous devices based on notions of "convenience, fairness,
and policy."21 As the Supreme Court phrased it,
"[p]resumptions typically serve to assist courts in managing
circumstances in which direct proof, for one reason or another,
is rendered difficult ....

Arising out of considerations

of

fairness, public policy, and probability, as well as judicial
economy, presumptions are also useful devices for allocating
the burdens of proof between parties."'
Writing in 1931, Edmund Morgan observed that "[tihere
are but few presumptions which are invented for the sole
purpose of reaching what the courts deem a socially desirable
result."23 Even Morgan, however, recognized that "[iut is now
common learning that the common-law judges have made
extensive use of the device of presumptions for two purposes: to
control the jury in its function of fact finding, and to change the

21. Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 65 (1961).
22. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988).
What is likely, for instance, is often presumed. Most men are sane, as the
law reckons sanity, and most properly sent letters reach their destination.
In the absence of any evidence pointing to an opposite conclusion in the
case at hand, it is both convenient and fair to assume that this testator,
or this man accused of crime was sane when he made the will or did the
act charged as criminal; or that this properly mailed letter reached the
addressee.
James, supra note 21, at 65-66 (footnotes omitted).
23. Edmund M. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44
HARv. L. REv. 906, 930 (1931).
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accepted rules of the common law without the appearance of
judicial legislation."'24
The substantive impact of presumptions and burdens of
proof as well as the role of courts in shaping them have come
under increasing scrutiny since Morgan's era. In his book
melding law and rhetoric, Richard H. Gaskins argues that an
argument strategy born in the legal arena and reaching
preeminence in the Warren Court era has been appropriated as
a common rhetorical device in public discourse of every sort.2 5
He describes the "pervasive" but "hidden role of argumentsfrom-ignorance"" that employ "the skillful shifting of
customary proof burdens."27
The argument-from-ignorance is widely distributed across the
rhetorical landscape. Its general pattern is an affirmative
inference from the lack of knowledge. In order to work as an
argument, it requires some kind of decision rule (usually
unstated) about how the parties to a discussion should
proceed in the face of uncertainty or indeterminacy. 8,
With respect to the field of constitutional law, for example,
Gaskins observes:
[I]t makes an enormous difference who bears the burden of
proof on constitutional questions: whether it is the
government that must show how its actions are constitutional
or the challenger that must show how they are not. This
choice is critical, since the degree of proof required can be set
so high
in either case that it is virtually impossible to
29
meet.
The common law evolution in Indian law described in Part
III provides a powerful example of Gaskins's argument-fromignorance in that the Court is working in an area in which
Congress, which has the power to decide the issue, is
essentially silent. The presumptions crafted by the Court in the
face of indeterminacy decide outcome, and a switch in

24. Id. at 909 (emphasis added).

25. GASKINS, supra note 5; see also Volume 17, issue 3, HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y (1994) (symposium issue, precipitated by Gaskins' book, on presumptions and
burdens of proof).
26. GASKINS, supra note 5, at xiv.
27. Id. at 48.
28. Id. at xv.
29. Id. at 54.
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presumptions evidences a fundamental alteration in
substance-in this context, a fundamental change in the
relative scopes of state and tribal power.
III.

A.

STATE VERSUS TRIBAL POWER

The Sphere of State Power in Indian Country

The foundation for the development of the common law
pertaining to the scope of authority of state law in Indian country is Chief Justice John Marshall's opinions in the Cherokee
cases: Cherokee Nation v. Georgia3" and Worcester v. Georgia.3 1 While much can be said about those cases,3" the important point for our purposes is that Worcester held that
Georgia's laws had no effect in Indian country, even with respect to non-Indians residing there.33 Justice Marshall concluded that the Federal government had recognized, through
treaties, the Indian nations as "distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
exclusive." 4 Because under the Supremacy Clause the states
could not supersede the Federal government's authority, the
states could not exercise sovereignty in Indian country.
Much of the subsequent common-law development of Indian law regarding the relative scopes of state and tribal power
has occurred in the modern era. Charles F. Wilkinson begins
his book, American Indians, Time, and the Law, with the assertion that the modern era of federal Indian law was introduced
in 1959, at the cusp of the Indian policy of self-determination,3" with the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v.
Lee." In that watershed case of humble facts, the Court decid-

30. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
31. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823) (dealing with Indian land title), completes Justice Marshall's trilogy of cases
providing the foundations of Indian law.
32. "The Cherokee cases were the central fury of what was, by all accounts,
one of the greatest constitutional crises in the history of the nation." GETCHES,
supra note 12, at 128 (citations omitted). For a brief historical background surrounding the cases, see id.at 122-30 and 137-39, and for a more probing analysis
of the cases themselves, see Ball, supra note 9, at 20-43.
33. Worcester involved the criminal conviction of Worcester and six other missionaries who violated a Georgia law requiring all non-Indians residing in Cherokee
Country to obtain a license from the governor. He was sentenced to four years of
hard labor.
34. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557.
35. See supra note 12 (briefly describing eras in Indian policy).
36. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS,
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ed that a non-Indian merchant doing business on the Navajo
reservation could not bring a civil suit in Arizona state court
against a Navajo who failed to pay his installment loan. The
Court concluded that only the Navajo courts had jurisdiction to
hear the dispute," though the Court did not rely on any congressional statute in requiring that result. 8
That result was truly startling. If the defendant had been
literally anyone else in the world other than an Indian residing
on a reservation, the state court would have had subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case.
An action on a contract is normally a transitory cause of action that can be brought to suit in a forum other than the onq
in which the contract was executed. Thus a contract made in
another state, or even a foreign country, would be within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Apache County Superior
Court. The rule in Williams, however, requires that the case
be heard exclusively within the tribal system in order to promote and protect tribal self-government.3 9
Out of that obscure installment loan transaction and the sixparagraph opinion dealing with it arose the modern body of
judicially created law that fills the large vacuum that Congress
has left in defining the sphere of state power over activities
occurring in Indian country.

TIME, AND THE LAw 1 (1987).
37. 358 U.S. at 222-23.
38. Public Law 280, supra note 14, was enacted in 1953, and the Court could
simply have cited that law to reach the same result. That law provides that certain states, Arizona not included, must accept criminal and civil jurisdiction over
crimes and disputes arising in Indian country. Other states could assume such
jurisdiction after following the appropriate procedures. Arizona did not choose to do
so. The Court in Williams v. Lee could simply have cited the failure of Arizona to
assume civil jurisdiction under the terms of the statute as the reason why the

state had no such jurisdiction and thus could not open its courts to the dispute.
While the Court did refer in passing to the statute, see 358 U.S. at 222-23, it
clearly was not the basis for the decision. See Robert Laurence, The Indian Com.
merce Clause, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 233 n.239 (1981).
Public Law 280 was construed in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976),
to apply only to civil court jurisdiction, not to civil regulatory jurisdiction. Thus,
Public Law 280 states have jurisdiction to hear civil cases arising in Indian country but do not necessarily have the power to regulate in Indian country. The power
to tax and regulate is not the subject of any general congressional statute, though
some specific civil matters are addressed. See, e.g., The Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act, supra note 20; The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963
(1988). Thus, the scope of the civil power of states to tax and regulate in Indian
country has been largely relegated to common-law development.
39. WILKINSON, supra note 36, at 1.
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The result in Williams v. Lee was not the result of a simple

application of the Worcester rule that state law had no effect
with respect to activities occurring in Indian country. Rather,
the Court in Williams v. Lee required an analysis not undertaken by the Worcester Court: "Essentially, absent governing Acts
of Congress, the question has always been whether the state
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them."' Thus, contrary to the
implications of Worcester, in the face of congressional silence,
some state authority in Indian country may not be struck down
by the Court under modern analysis. Nevertheless, the language of Williams v. Lee focused forthrightly on the central
issue: the scope of tribal sovereignty to make law. Out of Williams v. Lee's respect for tribal sovereignty grew a body of common law that was relatively solicitous of assertions of tribal
power over Indian country activities, whether pertaining to
Indians or non-Indians, and relatively unreceptive to assertions
of state power over activities in Indian country.
The language focusing on tribal sovereignty in Williams v.
Lee held the potential for the Court to craft the contours of
tribal sovereignty in an open and explicit fashion, discussing
outright the underlying tensions and questions that drive the
definition. The Court later replaced the Williams v. Lee sovereignty approach of measuring the scope of state authority in
Indian country, however, with a "preemption" analysis, first
introduced in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission*"
in 1973 and nominally remaining the controlling test today
under the common-law inquiry."2 The adoption of that test

40. 358 U.S. at 220.
41. 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (disallowing state income taxation of wages earned by
an Indian on a reservation).
42. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), the
Court maintained that the sovereignty analysis of Willants u. Lee remained an
independent ground, in addition to preemption, for striking down state law.
The two barriers are independent because either, standing alone, can be a
sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken
on the reservation or by tribal members. They are related, however, in
two important ways. The right of tribal self-government is ultimately
dependent on and subject to the broad power of Congress. Even so, traditional notions of Indian self-government are so deeply ingrained in our
jurisprudence that they have provided an important backdrop7 against
which vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured.
Id. at 143 (citation omitted). But the Court's rhetoric has not been borne out by its
decisions. Preemption has since remained the sole tool by which the Court has
measured state power in Indian country.
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and its application over the years shifted the inquiry away
from frank and difficult discussions of the scope of tribal sovereignty.
Preemption, in general,
is a constitutional doctrine that permits Congress to oust all
or some state authority in subject matter areas where states
have authority to legislate absent federal action.... In each
case the state or local law would have been a valid exercise of
the police power but for the terms or intent of federal legislation which conflicted with the state law or which was so comprehensive as to occupy the field. Federal preemption, of
course, is based on the exercise of constitutional authority
(often but not always the Commerce Clause) coupled with the
Supremacy Clause of article VI, clause 2."
In Indian law, preemption of state law is driven by congressional authority under the Indian Commerce Clause coupled with
the Supremacy Clause.
Merely invoking the word "preemption" and inquiring
whether state law is preempted by the interests of the federal
government on behalf of the tribes leaves several questions
unresolved regarding precisely how the doctrine is to be applied. Congress is silent on this issue. Thus, the Supreme Court
relies on the argument-from-ignorance in the face of the indeterminacy left them by Congress, and the choice of presumptions selected by the Justices is crucial to outcome. The Justices must choose between two antipodal presumptions when
creating the resulting common law: Should we presume that
state law is invalid (preempted)absent express authorizationby
Congress that state law should have effect, or should we presume that state law is valid (notpreempted) unless implicitly or
explicitly prohibited by Congress? That is, must Congress act to
extend state law to the transaction at issue, or must Congress
act to grant tribes an immunity from state law to the transaction at issue?
The choice between these two diametrically opposed presumptions is decisive. By definition, there is no statutory or
treaty authority purporting to address the precise exercise of
state action at issue, or else the common-law approach need
not be invoked. In most cases only vague treaty terms or simply the bald fact that Congress set aside the reservation for the
43. GETCHES, supra note 12, at 453.
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Indians is the sole federal authority that the Court must consult in determining whether state law is preempted." Such
authority, obviously, is no help at all. The presumption the
Justices bring to the inquiry is therefore outcome-determinative. If one presumes that Congress must act to grant an immunity or exemption from state law, state law will be held to
apply. If one presumes that Congress must act to extend state
law to the transaction, state law will be held inapplicable.
What should inform which presumption controls? The
Court in these common-law cases is ostensibly acting as a surrogate decision-maker for Congress. The Court would not even
be in the business of deciding these cases absent the punt by
Congress through its silence. While Congress has not spoken to
the direct action at issue, Congress has articulated its position
in Indian policy since the dawn of the modern era-the era in
which this common-law analysis developed-as one that seeks
to protect and develop Indian self-determination, self-government, autonomy, and economic development and selfsufficiency.45 If one bears that congressional policy in mind, it
seems that the appropriate presumption to bring to most cases,
if perhaps not all, is the one that presumes state action is invalid unless Congress affirmatively extends state law to the
transaction. Indeed, the Court may be constitutionally bound to
bring this presumption to cases. No congressional grant of
"immunity" from state law need be shown to escape state regulation. Because Congress is silent, the application of state law
to the transaction is invalid.
This, in fact, accurately describes the presumption that
was brought to bear in preemption analysis before 1989 in
many, though admittedly not all, of the cases decided under the
common law.4" The opposite presumption was brought to bear

44. E.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
45. See supra note 12 (briefly describing current policy).
46. That is, Indian law preemption analysis often resulted in bringing to bear
precisely the opposite presumption that is often brought to non-Indian preemption
analysis. GrcIHES, supra note 12, at 456. For this reason, non-Indian law preemption cases are not cited in Indian law preemption cases, and vice versa.
The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally
unhelpful to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those
standards of preemption that have emerged in other areas of the law.
Tribal reservations are not States, and the differences in the form and
nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to import to one notions
of pre-emption that are properly applied to the other.
White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 143.
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in situations that arguably did not implicate the notion of
"sovereignty" that informs the choice of presumptions in favor
of presuming the inapplicability of state law. I summarize
below the four categories to which each presumption was
brought and some illustrative cases.47
1. Category 1: Application of state law to Indians in Indian
country
This is the strongest category in which the presumption
against the validity of state law applies. The failure of Congress to extend state authority to a given transaction means
that the state law is invalid. No grant of congressional "immunity" from state regulation need be shown. Indeed, the state is
without jurisdiction "absent an express authorization from
47. In so doing, I must make the same disclaimer made by Professor
Wilkinson in his book:
I seek to explore the central ideas-the undercurrents of doctrine--that
explain and justify the elaborate structure the Supreme Court has built
in this field during the last quarter of a century. In doing this, I have
been drawn primarily to the holdings and results of the cases, not just to
the Court's stated reasons. This means that I sometimes identify concepts
and employ terms not found in the opinions. Nonetheless, I am convinced
that my approach accurately describes what in fact has occurred and that
it plants a principled and comprehensive set of justifications for the field
of Indian law.
WILIUNSON, supra note 36, at 3.
My juxtaposing of the antipodal presumptions, for example, implies a per se
approach explicitly rejected in the Court's language. In Ramah Navajo School
Board v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982), the Solicitor General specifically
requested that the Court "hold that on-reservation activities involving a resident
tribe are presumptively beyond the reach of state law even in the absence of comprehensive federal regulation, thus placing the burden on the State to demonstrate
that its intrusion is . . . condoned by Congress." Id. at 845. Justice Marshall's
opinion, while striking down the state's attempt to tax an activity performed by
non-Indians in Indian country, declined to adopt the test. Id. at 846. Instead, the
Court purports to make a "particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in
the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law."
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980). In short, the
Court purports to engage in a balancing test under its preemption analysis. Cf.
Stephen M. Feldman, Preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Implications
for Federal Indian Law, 64 OR. L. REv. 667, 678 (1986) ('[I]f
contemporary Indian
preemption analysis is ultimately a balancing test, is it really preemption?").
The Court's decisions invariably contain lengthy analyses of tangentially related
statutes, treaties, and federal regulations that purportedly evidence whether state
authority is preempted. Nevertheless, I believe that such analyses were the necessary supporting props that led to the outcomes that were nearly inevitable due to
the prior choice of presumptions through which those statutes and treaties were
viewed.
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Congress."" The direction of the presumption could not be
more dear. Though the presumed exemption from state law
does depend on the situs of the transaction being within Indian
country, it applies even if the transaction is of a transitory
character, i.e., one not relating to the land and which could
have occurred just as easily off as on the reservation, such as
the purchase of cigarettes.
Thus, the wages earned by McClanahan, a Navajo, on the
Navajo reservation were held not to be subject to state income
taxation.4 9 The Blackfeet Tribe's royalty interests under oil
and gas leases pertaining to reservation resources and issued
to non-Indian lessees were held not subject to taxation by Montana."0 The operation of gambling facilities by Indians on reservation land was held not subject to state regulation." State
excise taxes were held inapplicable to the sale of reservation
land owned in fee by Indians. 52 State excise taxes and registration fees were held inapplicable to motor vehicles owned by
Indians living on reservation land and used both on and off
reservations.5 3 Moreover, the purchase of cigarettes by Indians on Indian reservations was held not subject to state sales
and other cigarette taxes.'

48. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985 (1993).
49. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). The
exemption from state income tax was extended to non-reservation land that nevertheless constitutes "Indian country" in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985 (1993).
50. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
51. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
52. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992). Under a statutory analysis, the Yakima Court
upheld the imposition of a state ad ualore, property tax on fee-patented reservation land owned by Indians. The statute at issue, however, did not address excise
taxes on the sale of land. Under the common-law approach taken in the case of a
statutory void, that tax was struck down.
The more intrusive tax-the tax on the Indian land itself-was upheld
[which could result in foreclosure on the Indian-owned land with title
vesting in the state], while the less intrusive tax-the tax on the act of
selling the land-was struck down as invalid, as an impermissible intrusion on Indian self-government and self-determination. It makes no sense.
Geier, supra note 12, at 450 n.32 (criticizing the statutory analysis under which
the property tax was upheld).
53. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463
(1976). The exemption from excise and related motor vehicle fees was extended to
non-reservation land that nevertheless constitutes "Indian country" in Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985, 1991 (1993).
54. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
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2. Category 2: Application of state law to Indians outside
Indian country
This is a category where the opposite presumption is
brought to bear. Nondiscriminatory state laws otherwise applicable to all citizens of the state are presumed to apply to Indians outside Indian country unless there is "express federal law
to the contrary."55 Again, the direction of the presumption
could not be more clear. While state law can be held to be inapplicable to Indians outside Indian country, a specific congressional grant of immunity from state action must be shown for
Indians outside Indian country to escape state regulation. State
law applies presumptively unless there is an express federal
law to the contrary, such as a treaty expressly protecting offreservation hunting or fishing.56 Because Congress is usually
silent in these cases, state authority is upheld. Thus, New
Mexico's gross receipts taxes could be assessed against the
gross receipts realized by the Mescalero Apache Tribe with
respect to the operation of its ski resort built outside its reservation.57
3. Category 3: Application of state law to non-Indians in Indian country: land-relatedtransactions
Until 1989, the same presumption described in category
one applied here, even though the subject of the state action
was non-Indian. State regulation was presumed invalid in Indian country without an affirmative grant by Congress of "immunity." Thus, Arizona could not impose its motor carrier license tax and fuel tax on non-Indian logging companies, employed by the White Mountain Apache Tribe to harvest the
reservation's timber, to the extent the assessments were attributable to travel on tribal roads.58 A non-Indian who was a fed-

U.S. 134 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463
(1976).
55. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
56. Cf. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (upholding
"terminated" tribe's continuing power to regulate hunting and fishing on land once
reserved to them under a treaty).
57. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
58. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 148-53 (1980).
The tie to the land can be seen in Justice Marshall's admonition that "[t]ho Court
has repeatedly emphasized that there is a significant geographical component to
tribal sovereignty, a component which remains highly relevant to the pre-emption
inquiry." Id. at 151.
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erally licensed "Indian trader" operating a permanent establishment on reservation land was not subject to a "transaction
privilege tax" assessed against the seller of goods, not the buyer, for the privilege of doing business in Arizona. 9 New Mexico was prevented from assessing its gross receipts tax on a nonIndian construction company that built a Navajo school on
reservation land.60 That state was also prevented from superimposing its hunting and fishing regulations on top of the
Mescalero Apache Tribe's regulatory scheme as they pertained
to nonmembers engaging in these activities on reservation
trust land.6 '
4. Category 4: Application of state law to non-Indians in Indian country: transitory transactions
The collective results in categories one, two, and
three-that state law is presumed valid when applied to transactions outside Indian country (even though applied to Indians)
and that state law is presumed invalid in Indian country (even
though applied to non-Indians)-make conceptual sense when
one remembers that sovereign power, which informs the choice
of presumptions, must have a geographic component. Thus,
the results in categories one, two, and three are reflected in the
general assertion found in the often-cited 1982 edition of Felix
S. Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law: "State law generally is not applicable to Indian affairs within the territory of an
Indian tribe, absent the consent of Congress. '
Professors

59. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685
(1965). The same tax was held inapplicable to a company that sold 11 tractors to

Gila River Farms, an enterprise of the Gila River Indian Tribe. See Central Mach.
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980). Unlike in Warren Trading,
the sales in Central Machinery were transitory; the seller had no permanent Cstablishment on the reservation. The potential taxpayer (the seller) was thus much
like the potential taxpayers (the buyers) in the cigarette tax cases. See infra notes
65-77 and accompanying text. For that reason, Justice Powell dissented in Central
Machinery but concurred with the majority in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, decided the same day. See Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 170 (Powell. J.,
dissenting).
60. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
61. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
62. "Theories of sovereignty have long rested on the primacy of territo.
ry ....

" Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes. States. and the Fed-

eral Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 700 (1989). See supra note 58 and mnfra note
70 and accompanying text (quoting judicial pronouncements regarding the land
component of sovereignty).
63. COHEN, supra note 3, at 259.
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Getches, Wilkinson, and Williams use even stronger language:
"IT]here is effectively a heavy presumption against the incursion of state law into Indian country."64
In the narrow situation when non-Indians travel to Indian
country and engage in transitory transactions unrelated to the
land, however, the Court has applied the opposite presumption,
described in category two, that state law applies absent affirmative immunity granted by Congress, notwithstanding that
the transaction took place in Indian country. Therefore, in this
situation, state law applies to non-Indians in Indian country
with respect to a transitory transaction, though not to Indians.
Reservation sales of cigarettes to non-Indians who travelled to the reservation in the hope of escaping state sales and
other excise taxes imposed on the purchase of cigarettes came
before the Court in 1976 and 1980.65 The involved tribes generated substantial revenues through these smokeshops, revenues which were deployed in combating the severe poverty on
the reservation. The Court conceded that the savings of approximately one dollar per carton that were realized by the nonIndians travelling to the reservation were the sole incentive for
the non-Indians to make the trip. Absent the tax exemption,
the business of the smokeshops, and thus the revenues realized
by the tribes, would diminish substantially. 6
Though the Indians who purchased the cigarettes were
held to be free from state taxes under the presumption described in category one, the Court declined to apply that presumption to the non-Indian purchasers," notwithstanding
that the purchases occurred in Indian country.6" Justice

64. GETCHES, supra note 12, at 455.
65. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463
(1976).
66. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 145.
67. The Colville case actually went much further than applying state law to
non-Indians in Indian country. The Court held that Indians who were nonmembers
of the governing tribes were also subject to the state taxes at issue. See id., 447
U.S. at 160-61; see also supra note 20 (describing similar equation of nonmember
Indians with non-Indians in Duro u. Reina, a case arising in the criminal area
which was subsequently overturned by congressional statute).
68. The ability of the state to enforce its tax is another matter. Tribes have
balked at having to act as the state's collection mechanism. Though the Court has
ruled that tribes must shoulder the "minimum burden" of collecting the otherwise
valid tax imposed with respect to sales to nonmembers, see Moe, 425 U.S. at 483,
the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity prevents the states from suing the tribes
for nonpayment. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,
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White's opinion in Colville concluded: "We do not believe that
principles of federal Indian law, whether stated in terms of
preemption, tribal self-government, or otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation to
69
persons who would normally do their business elsewhere."
There was no citation to the land cases in which non-Indians in
Indian country were held to be free from state regulation and
taxation, but Justice White noted that "the present taxes are
assessed against nonmembers of the Tribes and concern transactions in personalty with no substantial connection to reservation lands."7 °
The Court clearly invoked the presumption that state law
is valid rather than the presumption that state law is invalid.
Justice White stated:

498 U.S. 505, 508-10 (1991). States may, however, seize as contraband those cigarettes that fail to bear the stamp evidencing that the tax imposed on the retailer
has been paid with respect to cigarettes intended for sale to nonmembers, so long
as the seizures occur outside Indian country, i.e., while the cigarettes are still en
route to the reservations from wholesalers. Colville, 447 U.S. at 161-62. The same
issue has caused violence in the state of New York. See Lindsey Gruson, New
Betrayal, Senecas Say, And New Rage, N.Y. TIMEs, July 18, 1992, at 25; Department of Tax'n and Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 114 S. Ct. 2028 (1994) (uphold.
ing taxation of cigarettes sold by "Indian trader" wholesalers to reservation
smokeshops to extent cigarettes were estimated, through "probable demand" estimates, to be sold to nonmembers).
69. Colvile, 447 U.S. at 155. John Fredericks III argues that the notion that
the Indians were marketing a tax exemption drove the decision's result, though he
questions how that observation provides justification.
Contrary to the Coluille Court's reasoning, states commonly utilize their
governmental status competitively to attract outside enterprise. Under the
state sales tax schemes utilized in the United States, people can easily
avoid one state's high sales tax by purchasing their goods across state
lines in a neighboring state with a lower tax rate or no tax rate at
all. . . .Admittedly, tribal sovereignty is limited; but it is Congress' [sic)
role to limit it, not the Court's. Congress has not taken away the right of
tribes to utilize their sovereign status to attract commercial enterprise to
the reservation.
John Fredericks III, State Regulation in Indian Country: The Supreme Court's Marketing Exemptions Concept. A Judicial Sword Through the Heart of Tribal SelfDetermination, 50 MONTr. L. REV. 49, 63-64 (1989) (footnote omitted). The last sentence reveals his views regarding where the presumption should lie.
Fredericks also takes issue with the Court's argument that the tribal taxing
power is diminished since the value marketed by the tribe was not generated on
the reservation. Fredericks points out that no showing was required by the state of
Washington that the tobacco was grown in the state or that the cigarettes were
manufactured or packaged in the state in order to assert its taxing power with
respect to the sales occurring within the state. See id.at 63-67.
70. Colville, 447 U.S. at 156.
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The federal statutes cited to us, even when given the broadest
reading to which they are fairly susceptible, cannot be said to

pre-empt Washington's sales and cigarette taxes. [Statutes

such as the Indian Reorganization Act and the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Act] evidence to varying degrees a congressional concern with fostering tribal self-government and economic development, but none goes so far as
to grant tribal enterprises selling goods to nonmembers an
artificial competitive advantage over all other businesses in a
State.71

Similarly, in analyzing the susceptibility of Indians who were
not members of the governing tribes to the state taxes at issue," Justice White stated:
Federal statutes, even given the broadest reading to which
they are reasonably susceptible, cannot be said to pre-empt
Washington's power to impose its taxes on Indians not members of the Tribe .... [Tihe mere fact that nonmembers resi-

dent on the reservation come within the definition of "Indian"
for purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 ...
does not demonstrate a congressional intent to exempt such
Indians from state taxation."

In each case, Justice White assumed validity of the challenged
state authority and required proof that Congress intended to
provide an "exemption" from state law or to prohibit state law
from having effect, even though the transactions occurred in
Indian country.
As noted, the Court applied the opposite presumption with
respect to sales to member Indians. The same ambiguous, gen-74
erally unhelpful statutes were out there in both instances;
the difference in outcome stemmed from the difference in presumptions taken into each analysis. The Court examined those
same statutes with different purposes in mind. With respect to
the nonmember purchasers, the Court examined the statutes to
determine whether one could reasonably infer a congressional
intent to grant an immunity from state law. Finding no such
intent, the Court approved taxes on nonmember purchasers,
71. Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
72. See supra note 67.
73. Colville, 447 U.S. at 160-61 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
74. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447

U.S. 134, 155-56 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S.
463, 477-79 (1976).
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With respect to the member Indians, the Court examined those
same statutes to determine whether one could reasonably infer
a congressional intent to extend state law to the transaction.
Finding no such intent, the Court concluded member Indians
could not be taxed on their purchases. The Justices' purpose in
one context was to find evidence of congressional immunity,
while in another context it was to find evidence of congressional extension of state law.
Perhaps the choice to use the presumption assuming validity of state authority can be justified in the category four case
if one both attaches a heavy significance to the geographic
component of sovereignty, which is perhaps weakened here in
view of the transiency of the transaction, and stresses the nonmember status of the person attempted to be reached by the
state. 75 That is, both components of sovereignty are diluted
here. There is certainly room for criticism, however.7" In any
75.

"[Jjurisdiction is grounded in a rough mixture of territorial and personal

criteria. Put another way, it matters both where things happen and to whom they
happen." Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation. 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
959, 978 (1991).
76. The tribes are most certainly affected even though the non-Indian buyer
is the one ostensibly taxed. The tribes often assert their own tax in addition to the
state tax. If only the tribe's taxes apply, non-Indians are encouraged to travel to
the reservation to buy their cigarettes so long as the tribal tax rate is lower than
the state's rate that applies to off-reservation sales. If both taxes apply, the combined state and tribal tax dissuades buyers from coming to the reservation and
even encourages reservation residents to travel outside the reservation to purchase
cigarettes; tribal sales, and thus profits, are reduced or eliminated unless the tribe
surrenders its own taxing power. The result hampers the current Indian policy of
encouraging tribal economic development and self-sufficiency. (The same concerns
apply to the severance taxes at issue in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,
490 U.S. 163 (1989), see infra notes 86-109 and accompanying text, which is a
much more troublesome case because the non-Indian mining activity sought to be
taxed by the state was not transitory but intimately connected to reservation land.)
The Court has not considered the impact on tribes to be sufficient to warrant
applying the more favorable presumption in its preemption analysis. Justice
Brennan has noted the Hobson's choice this creates.
Perhaps most striking is the fact that a rule permitting imposition of the
state taxes would have the curious effect of making the federal concerns
with tribal self-government and commercial development inconsistent with
one another. In essence, Tribes are put to an unsatisfactory choice. They
are free to tax sales to non-Indians, but doing so will place a burden
upon such sales which may well make it profitable for non-Indian buyers
who are located on the reservation to journey to surrounding communities
to purchase cigarettes. Or they can decide to remain competitive by not
taxing such sales, and in the process forgo revenues urgently needed to
fill governmental coffers. Commercial growth, in short, can be had only at
the expense of tax dollars. And having to make that choice seriously
intrudes on the Indians' right "to make their own laws and be ruled by
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event, the transitory transaction involving nonmembers was
the sole civil regulatory situation occurring in Indian country
before 1989 in which the presumption favoring validity of the
operation of state law was implicitly applied.7" If the transaction involved either Indians in Indian country (category one) or
nonmembers in Indian country in connection with a land-relat-

them."
Colville, 447 U.S. at 170-71 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 219-20). See also supra note 69 (describing one commentator's attack on the decision).
77. A niggling footnote is Rice v. Rehnar, 463 U.S. 713 (1983), a case not
easily classified. It is a difficult case to place because the Court's analysis was so
different from any preemption analysis either before it or after it. The Court decided, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, that state liquor licensing requirements
could apply to an Indian-owned establishment on a reservation that sold to both
members and nonmembers.
How the Court arrived at that result was puzzling. In determining whether the
state action was preempted, the Court first considered whether the subject matter
sought to be regulated was one traditionally regulated by the tribe--an inquiry
never before made in preemption analysis. Because the federal government historically occupied the field extensively, disallowing the tribes any room to regulate
independently, the Court concluded that the tribe had no tradition of regulating
the subject matter. Thus, the backdrop of sovereignty, see supra note 42, was not
significant in the preemption analysis. See Rice, 463 U.S. at 720-25. This turned
the traditional preemption inquiry on its head. The Court has always cited the
extensiveness of federal involvement in an area as a reason to conclude that the
state was preempted from regulating the area. Here, the extensive history of federal liquor regulation in Indian country had precisely the opposite effect.
If this analysis were undertaken in other cases, however, the result would not
always be unfavorable for the tribes. After the cigarette tax cases, see supra notes
65-76 and accompanying text, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130
(1982) (upholding tribal severance tax imposed on non-Indians mining reservation
land), and Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985) (upholding tribal
power to tax non-Indian leasehold interests and business activity in Indian country
without approval of Secretary of the Interior), the tribal power to tax non-Indians
was established. Yet, in neither the cigarette tax cases nor in Cotton Petroleum, see
infra notes 86-109 and accompanying text, did the existence of the tribal power
count against the existence of the state power to tax the same activities.
During the course of the discussion, Justice O'Connor also stated in Rice in an
offhand manner that in fact liquor regulation is an aspect of sovereignty of which
tribes were divested by virtue of their dependent status, a truly startling proposition. See 463 U.S. at 726 (i[The tribes have long ago been divested of any inherent self-government over liquor regulation by both explicit command of Congress
and as a 'necessary implication of their dependent status.'") (emphasis added); infra
notes 113-22 and accompanying text (describing the "exceptions" based on the
tribes' dependent status to the general rule that tribes retain all aspects of sovereignty not specifically divested by Congress). I am not alone in thinking this
opinion was truly bizarre. See Honorable William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of
Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18 (1987) (referring to
the "prime peculiarity" of O'Connor's majority opinion).
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ed transaction (category three), the opposite presumption was
brought to bear and thus state authority was struck down.
5.

Cotton Petroleum: A switch in presumptions

The change in 1989, described below, was not a result of
an explicit change in doctrine. Rather, it was a result of a shift
in power on the Court and an accompanying switch in the
presumptions brought to bear in preemption analysis. The pre1989 decisions striking down state power in Indian country by
adopting, under preemption analysis, the presumption that
state law was invalid were most often written by Justices Marshall, Brennan, or Blackmun, though sometimes by others. In
those cases, however, a steady stream of dissenting and separate opinions, usually written by Justices Stevens or
Rehnquist, disagreed with the presumption taken that assumed
invalidity of state law absent affirmative congressional extension of the state law to Indian country. The writers of these
dissents made it clear that they believed that the presumption
adopted by Justice White in the category four case should apply
in all category three cases and perhaps even category one cases
as well. In 1989, these Justices finally controlled the Court and
embedded their far different presumption into the preemption
analysis.
For example, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indi78
ans was a pre-1989 category one case. It considered whether
the state of California could regulate Indian-owned and operated gambling casinos in Indian country. The majority opinion
concluded that California had no such power absent congressional extension of state authority to Indian country, explicitly
invoking the presumption that state law is inapplicable to
Indians in Indian country absent affirmative authorization by
Congress. "It is clear, however, that state laws may be applied
to tribal Indians on their reservations if Congress has expressly
so provided. Here the State insists that Congress has twice
given its express consent .... We disagree in both respects.""9
Justice Stevens dissented, however, expressly invoking the
opposite presumption.
Unless and until Congress exempts Indian.managedgambling
from state law and subjects it to federal supervision, I believe

78. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
79. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
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that a State may enforce its laws prohibiting high-stakes
gambling on Indian reservations within its borders. Congress
has not pre-empted California's prohibition against highstakes bingo games and the Secretary of the Interior plainly
has no authority to do so."

The difference in threshold presumptions taken into the preemption analysis could not be more clearly articulated. Both
writers analyzed the same statutes, but one looked for an implicit extension of state authority to Indians in Indian country.
The other looked for a grant of immunity to Indians in Indian
country. Neither found what they were looking for. Thus,
threshold presumptions determined outcomes.
Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue8 and
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker"2 were category three
cases, each dealing with land-related transactions in Indian
country and involving non-Indians. The majority in each case
held state taxation of the transactions at issue to be unlawful,
applying the familiar presumption that assumes the invalidity
of state law in Indian country absent express extension by
Congress, even though the activity is conducted by non-Indians.
The dissent in White Mountain Apache Tribe, written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Rehnquist and Stewart,
again adopted the presumption that state law governs unless
Congress affirmatively prohibits its application.
As a general rule, a tax is not invalid simply because a nonexempt taxpayer may be expected to pass all or part of the cost
through to a person who is exempt from tax .... In this case,
... I would not infer the congressional intent to confer a tax
immunity. Although this may be an appropriate way in which
to subsidize Indian industry and encourage Indian self-government, I would require more explicit evidence of congressional intent than that relied on by the Court today."
Justice Stevens presumed the non-Indians to be subject to
the tax and did not infer from the statutes discussed in the
case the congressional intent to confer an immunity from state
regulation. Justice Rehnquist penned a similar dissenting opinion in Ramah, joined by Justices Stevens and White, which is

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
458 U.S. 832 (1982).
448 U.S. 136 (1980).
Id. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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infused with the presumption that state law presumptively
applies to non-Indians in Indian country in category three cases. The dissent failed to find in the statutes discussed in the
case affirmative evidence that Congress intended to prohibit
application of, grant an immunity from, state law to the transaction in Indian country.'
In 1989, Justices Stevens and White, and those who joined
their opinions, succeeded in establishing their minority positions in majority and important plurality opinions in the category three context: the application of state law to nonmembers
in Indian country with respect to land-related transactions.'
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court in Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico8" upheld the authority of the
state to impose its severance tax on the production of oil and
gas by non-Indian lessees of wells located on the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe reservation. The Court had previously upheld the
power of the tribe to impose its own severance tax on the same
activity.8" Confirmation of the validity of the state tax meant

84. See 458 U.S. at 848 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (referring to 'reservation
immunity from nondiscriminatory state taxation").
85. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). See
infra notes 125-37 and accompanying text (discussing Brendale).
86. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
87. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). Justice
Stevens predictably wrote a dissenting opinion in Merrion, joined by Justice
Rehnquist and then-Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cotton Petroleum was filed in response to an invitation extended by Justice Marshall
in footnote 26 of the majority opinion in Merrion. One of the arguments made by
the non-Indian lessees in Merrion that the tribe had no power to impose a severance tax on its mining activities was based on the Interstate Commerce Clause.
Petitioners contend that because New Mexico may tax the same mining
activity at full value, the Indian tax imposes a multiple tax burden on
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. The multiple
taxation issue arises where two or more taxing jurisdictions point to some
contact with an enterprise to support a tax on the entire value of its
multistate activities, which is more than the contact would justiy. This
Court has required an apportionment of the tax based on the portion of
the activity properly viewed as occurring within each relevant State.
This rule has no bearing here, however, for there can be no claim
that the Tribe seeks to tax any more of petitioners' mining activity than
the portion occurring within Tribal jurisdiction. Indeed, petitioners do not
even argue that the Tribe is seeking to seize more tax revenues than
would be fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe. In the absence of such an assertion, and when the activity taxed by the Tribe
occurs entirely on tribal lands, the multiple taxation issue would arise
only if a State attempted to levy a tax on the same activity, which is
more than the State's contact with the activity would justify. In such a
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practically that the tribe would have to forgo its own tax in order to continue to attract lessees to mine reservation reserves
rather than off-reservation reserves.88
In the course of the Court's opinion, Justice Stevens articulated the precise choice between presumptions that is necessary
under preemption analysis.
This Court's approach to the question whether a State may
tax on-reservation oil production by non-Indian lessees has
varied over the course of the past century. At one time, such a
tax was held invalid unless expressly authorized by Congress;
more recently, such taxes have been upheld unless expressly
or impliedly prohibited by Congress. "
The latter assertion is a bit disingenuous because it was Cotton
Petroleum itself that established as the majority rule that the
appropriate presumption to apply is that state action against
non-Indians in Indian country, even with respect to transactions intimately pertaining to land, is valid unless Congress
acts to prohibit the application of state law.
Justice Stevens made clear that this presumption, formerly
applied in Indian country only in the cigarette tax cases, was
precisely the one he was applying. There could be no "marketing of a tax exemption" here in connection with sales that are
movable; here, there was an intimate connection with reservation land, the geographic component of sovereign power. The
circumstance, any challenge asserting that tribal and State taxes create a
multiple burden on interstate commerce should be directed at the state
tax, which, in the absence of congressional ratification, might be invalidated under the Commerce Clause. These cases, of course, do not involve a
challenge to state taxation, and we intimate no opinion on the possibility
of such a challenge.
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 158 n.26.
88. The Commerce Clause argument broached by Justice Marshall in Merrion
was rejected by the Court in Cotton Petroleum.
It is . . . well established that the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses have very different applications. In particular, while the
Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with maintaining free trade
among the States even in the absence of implementing federal legislation,
the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs ....
[T]he fact that States and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over the
same territory makes it inappropriate to apply Commerce Clause doctrine
developed in the context of commerce "among" States with mutually exclusive territorial jurisdiction to trade "with" Indian tribes.
490 U.S. at 192 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 173.
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resources were not conveniently relocated to the reservation for
subsequent removal. Yet, he required congressional evidence of
a grant of "immunity" or "exemption" from the tax, just as in
the category four cases involving transitory transactions, the
purchase of cigarettes by non-Indians.9" "The question for us
to decide is whether Congress has acted to grant the Tribe such
immunity, either expressly or by plain implication."9 ' He noted that "it bears emphasis that ... congressional silence no
longer entails a broad-based immunity from taxation for private parties doing business with Indian tribes"' and admonished that "courts should be careful not to make legislative
decisions in the absence of congressional action. 9 3 Thus, the
affirmative action demanded of Congress was persuasive evidence that it intended to grant an immunity or exemption from
a presumptively applicable tax on non-Indians dealing with
tribes in Indian country, even with respect to activities intimately pertaining to reservation land. A more stark adoption of
the presumption he first championed in dissenting opinions
cannot be imagined. 4
The federal statute examined for such evidence was the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, which regulated mineral
leasing in Indian country and which, predictably, "neither expressly permits state taxation nor expressly precludes it."95
Because of the presumption adopted, the state law was held
not to be preempted.

90. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
91. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 175-76 (emphasis added). The reference to
the tribe as taxpayer is puzzling. The question was whether the non-Indian lessees
were free from the tax. Justice Stevens emphatically rejected the argument that
the economic burden of the tax was indirectly borne by the tribe.
92. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
93. Id at 177.
94. One of the arguments made by Justice Stevens in adopting this presumption is that the discredited intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine would have
otherwise been revived through the back door. See id. at 173-76. That defunct
doctrine prevented taxation by the state of private parties dealing with the federal
government or its instrumentalities, including Indian tribes, on the theory that the
state was indirectly taxing the federal government. Such reasoning, however, begs
the question. Even though the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine is discredited, the majority of cases premised on that doctrine had nothing to do with Indian tribes. Under the completely independent preemption analysis, applying only in
the case of Indian tribes, it is unclear why the presumption adopted by Justice
Stevens was required. If a tax is struck down under preemption analysis, it is
struck down for far different reasons than those that drove the intergovernmental
tax immunity doctrine.
95. Id. at 177.

480

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1994

Justice Blackmun wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. He, too, believed that
the relevant statute to examine was the 1938 Act. He, too,
found that "[the 1938 Act is silent on the question of state
taxation."96 But while that silence provided evidence to Justice Stevens that Congress had not granted an immunity or
exemption from the state tax at issue, it provided evidence to
Justice Blackmun that Congress had not acted to extend the
application of state law to non-Indians in Indian country in
connection with such a transaction. "[Tihe silence of the 1938
Act is eloquent and argues forcefully against the result reached
by the majority."" The difference in outlook, once again, was
a result of the difference in the underlying presumption
brought to bear when examining the only congressional evidence available, evidence which, as usual, did not answer the
precise question before the Court.
The dichotomy in presumptions applied in Indian country
to land-related transactions, depending on whether the potential taxpayer is Indian or non-Indian, could not have been more
stark. In 1985, the Court held in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of
Indians98 that New Mexico could not tax the royalties received
by the tribe under its leases precisely because the 1938 Act did
not expressly authorize taxation. Clearly, the presumption
usually applicable in a category one case 9 was applied that
state law is presumptively invalid with respect to Indians in
Indian country absent express extension by Congress of state
law to the transaction. In Cotton Petroleum, Justice Stevens
wrote: "Our conclusion that the 1938 Act does not expressly
authorize direct taxation of Indian tribes does not entail the
further step that the Act impliedly prohibits taxation of nonmembers doing business on a reservation."'' 0 He thus makes
it clear that he believes the opposite presumption applies in the
case of the non-Indian taxpayer in a category three case, requiring evidence that Congress prohibited application of the tax
instead of evidence that it extended application of the tax to the

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id at 194 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
471 U.S. 759 (1985).
See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (describing category ono cas-

es).
100. 490 U.S. at 183 n.14 (emphasis added).
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transaction, as in Blackfeet Tribe. Justice Blackmun was not
convinced.
But the majority takes the position that the 1938 Act's silence
means something completely different when it comes to the
kind of taxation at issue here, and expends considerable energy attempting to support that view. The majority argues that
the same silence that reflected an intent to prohibit state
taxation of Indian tribes' royalty interests was "fully consistent with
an intent to permit state taxation of nonmember les101
sees."
Once again, the different viewpoints depend upon what each
Justice is looking for in the only evidence available, which in
turn depends on the threshold presumption brought to the
preemption inquiry.
Cotton Petroleum purported to make no new law. Yet, the
approach adopted certainly is not consistent with such cases as
Warren Trading,"° Ramah Navajo School Board,"' and
White Mountain Apache Tribe.'" The fundamental switch in
presumptions was possible because the presumptions were
themselves almost invisible. Because the opinions ostensibly
adopted a balancing test in its approach to Indian preemption,0 5 the joints were flexible enough to allow whichever of
the two presumptions to control without seeming to change the
law. The federal and tribal interests that were held to be sufficient to preempt state law in Warren Trading, Ramah Navajo
School Board, and White Mountain Apache Tribe were simply
found to be insufficient to overcome state interests under the
new presumption. The federal presence in Cotton Petroleum-the extensive regulations under the 1938 Mineral Leasing Act-was more formidable"0 ' than the federal presence
examined in the prior cases. The state presence in Cotton Petroleum-regulating the spacing and mechanical integrity of
wells (apparently also regulated by the federal government)° 7 -was minuscule. Yet, balancing tests being what

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
ing the
107.

Id- at 196 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 47 (describing balancing test).
See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (recountcomprehensive and pervasive federal regulation).
See id. at 206 n.9.
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they are, the state presence was considered a weighty enough
interest for the state's interests to control. ' But that was all
merely the rhetoric of the opinion. The real reason for the outcome resided in the switch in the underlying presumptions
brought to bear.' °9
A second decision in 1989, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
& Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,"0 cemented the view
that the pre-1989 presumption in category three cases had
been ousted in favor of the presumption that favors the validity
of state law regarding the regulation of non-Indians in Indian
country, even when the regulation is intimately related to land.
In Brendale, the Court upheld the authority of Yakima County
to extend its zoning laws to those areas of Indian country containing a significant percentage of fee-patented land owned by
non-Indians."' Because that case also considered the power
of the tribe to zone in Indian country, however, I defer discussion of the case to the next subsection." 2

108. Id. at 186-87.
109. The result in Cotton Petroleum probably could have been predicted by
Judge Canby. Writing in 1987, Judge Canby worried that the switch from the
strict sovereignty approach of Williams v. Lee to McClanahan's preemption approach, adopting a balancing of interests, allowed for just the kind of fundamental
but covert change in analysis exemplified by Cotton Petroleum.
The McClanahan result was highly protective of tribal self-government, and one suspects that Chief Justice Marshall, had he been alive
when McClanahan was decided, would have happily accepted it. But
McClanahan contained the seeds of enormous change. By reducing sovereignty to a backdrop and relying on the preemptive effect of federal treaties and statutes, it reversed the fundamental presumption of inherent
tribal power applicable to disputes between tribes and states.

...
[I]n Indian law, as in many other areas, where the courts end up
depends upon where they start. Justice Thurgood Marshall himself always
applies his preemption analysis with great sensitivity to the "backdrop" of
tribal sovereignty, but it is probably fair to say that he does that in spite
of, rather than because of, the preemption doctrine he announced in
McClanahan.

Canby, supra note 77, at 7.
110. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
111. For an article discussing Brendale in depth and blasting it as a "recent
outrage in the tragic history of federal Indian law," see Joseph William Singer,
Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991).
112. See infra notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
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The Sphere of Tribal Power in Indian Country

On the flip side of the coin of the power of a state to regulate in Indian country is the power of tribes to regulate in Indian country. It is appropriate here to address briefly the analysis that attaches to assertions of tribal power in Indian country, for tribal power was also significantly eroded in the 1989
Brendale case. In fact, it was the expansion of state power in
Indian country (through the adoption of the presumption favoring state authority in category three cases) combined with
the erosion of tribal power in Indian country (through an expansive interpretation of the Montana exception)"
that
made 1989 such a watershed year in Indian law. Cotton Petroleum and Brendale combined to shift power in Indian country
from tribes to states through the common law.
With respect to assertions of tribal power over activities
occurring on reservations, the Supreme Court long respected
the teaching of Chief Justice Marshall in his trilogy that tribes
retained the inherent sovereign powers they exercised prior to
contact with the white man except to the extent inconsistent
with their dependent status after European settlement. Thus,
the general rule was that tribal power was retained unless
affirmatively divested by Congress under its plenary power.
Because Congress was most often silent, a de facto presumption arose that tribes retained the long-dormant powers they
increasingly sought to exercise in recent decades."' Until
1978, the only two powers held implicitly to be divested by
reason of the tribes' dependent status (and thus which had to
be affirmatively "revived" or "delegated" by Congress under the
opposite approach to the general rule) were those identified by
Chief Justice Marshall and premised on his notions of international law: the power to treat with foreign nations and the
power to dispose of aboriginal land title (entitling tribes to the
use and occupancy of land) without the consent of the federal
1 15
government.

113. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text (discussing Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)).
114. See, e-g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1985);
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 (1982); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 157 (1980) (each
case upholding the tribe's power to tax transactions undertaken by nonmembers in
Indian country).
115. See cases cited supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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As in the analysis of state power in Indian country, the
outcome of the analysis of tribal power thus turns on the presumption taken into the analysis. The Justices must decide
whether to look for evidence that Congress divested a power
otherwise retained by the tribe (i.e., whether the general rule
applies) or whether to look for evidence that Congress delegated a power implicitly divested by the tribes' dependent status
(i.e., whether one of the exceptions to the general rule applies).
Because Congress is silent, the choice between whether the
general rule applies or whether one of the exceptions applies
(i.e., the choice of presumptions) is (as in the analysis of the
scope of state power) outcome determinative. The content of the
exceptions and their scope thus become critical because they
dictate which presumption is taken into the analysis.
A century and a half passed before a third "exception" was
added to the two identified by Chief Justice Marshall. In
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,"' written by Justice
Rehnquist in 1978, the power to impose criminal sanctions on
non-Indians was held to be inconsistent with a tribe's dependent status. Thus, because this power was relegated to the
"exception" category, the presumption taken into the analysis
was that the power must be "delegated" by Congress. Finding
Congress silent, the power was held not to exist.
The change in presumptions when analyzing the scope of
tribal power in Indian country is much more explicit than in
the case of analyzing the scope of state power in Indian country. The Court must explicitly adopt an "exception" to the general presumption that sovereignty continues with respect to the
subject matter. The change in analysis cannot be hidden under
the rubric of a balancing test. The Court's announcement of an
additional exception in Oliphant after 150 years, with the concomitant explicit switch in underlying presumptions, has thus
been the subject of much criticism.1 1

116. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
117. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 17, at 1160-64 (analyzing the weaknesses in
Justice Rehnquist's opinion); Philip P. Frickey, Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Federal
Indian Law, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1209 (1989) (recounting Judge Canby's criti-

cisms that (1) while the first two exceptions noted by Chief Justice Marshall were
premised in European notions of international law, the additional exception fashioned in Oliphant was not premised on any source in particular, and (2) the practice of creating exceptions based on nothing but judicial preference may threaten
tribal autonomy); Kevin Meisner, Modem Problems of Criminal Jurisdiction in
Indian Country, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 175 (1992) (entire piece criticizing
Oliphant).
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A fourth exception, this time on the civil side, was added in
1 8 In an opinion written
1980 in Montana v. United States."
by
Justice Stewart, the Court held that the power to regulate nonIndians on fee-patented, reservation land in the absence of a
sufficient "tribal interest" at stake was similarly inconsistent
with the tribes' dependent status. Because Congress was silent,
tribes were considered to have lost the power to regulate nonIndians on fee-patented land unless the tribe could show that
the regulation had a "direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.""1 9 If
the tribal-interest test was met, the matter was once again put
back into the general-rule category. That is, even in the face of
congressional silence, the tribal power would be upheld.
Finding that the tribal-interest test was not met, and finding
no delegation of power by Congress, the Montana Court held
that the tribe had no power to regulate hunting and fishing on
fee-patented land held by non-Indians on the reservation."m

On the other hand, even such staunch supporters of tribal power as Vine
Deloria, Jr., recognize the "reality" surrounding Oliphant.
The Port Madison Reservation where the tribe lived contained 7,276
acres, 63% of which, or approximately 4,584 acres, was owned by nonIndians. While 2,928 non-Indians lived on the reservation, only fifty Indians resided there. The factual situation, therefore, was somewhat bizarre.
The attorneys for the Indians were arguing that fifty Indians, 1.7% of the
reservation population, should have basic municipal jurisdiction over nearly 3,000 non-Indians, more than 98.3% of the population of the reservation. The doctrine of tribal sovereignty, perhaps relevant for a large reservation such as the Navajo with millions of acres of land and over 100,000
residents, was expected to control the court's thinking in defiance of the
actual facts. Surely, here was an instance of a doctrine run amok.
When attorneys and scholars come to believe that doctrines have
greater reality than the data from which they are derived, all aspects of
the judicial process suffer accordingly.
Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflectins on the Con.
tent and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 215 (1989) (footnotes omitted) (quoted in Frickey, supra note 17, at 1237 n.466). Frickey's thesis is
premised on the practical nature of the reasoning process in Indian law.
The Court's creation of a sweeping "exception" that applies to all tribes is perhaps the chief criticism of Oliphant. Alternatively, the Court could have maintained
the presumption in favor of tribal power but, because of the unique facts of the
case, held that the presumption was rebutted for this tribe. That would have left
the Navajos, for example, free to develop their sovereign power to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country.
118. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
119. Id at 566.
120. In 1993, the Court extended this holding to non-trust reservation land
held by the federal government, where the state's interest is far more attenuated
than where the land is held by non-Indian residents of the state asserting jurisdic-
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Both the Montana exception itself as well as the application of the tribal-interest test to the facts of the case could be
questioned. Because all roads lead back to Congress, the real
question is which powers are so intimately related to dependent as opposed to independent sovereignty that the burden of
proof should be shifted to show a delegation by Congress of the
asserted power. Other matters excepted from the retained-power-unless-divested general rule were very fundamental powers:
transferring of aboriginal land title, treating with foreign powers, and imposing criminal sanctions on non-Indians. Is the
Montana exception of the same magnitude? And even if we
accept the Montana exception as an appropriate occasion to
shift the burden to show a delegation of power by Congress
absent a sufficient "tribal interest," why was there no sufficient
tribal interest in regulating hunting and fishing on these reservation lands? How can tribes regulate effectively, especially
hunting, on those lands over which the Court agrees the tribe
has jurisdiction if such lands are checkerboarded among nonIndian, fee-patented land on the reservation? And should not
on-reservation hunting and fishing per se fall under the general
rule as satisfying the tribal-interest test? Does not such regulation have a "direct effect"'21 on the economic security of the
tribe?' 2
Until Brendale, the Montana exception lay dormant in the
lower courts." In the Supreme Court, it was not mentioned
in either of two cases that stressed that tribes retained "attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory."" But Justice White's opinion in Brendale not only revived it but interpreted it in such a manner as to make it virtually impossible to satisfy the tribal-interest test (and thus re-

tion. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
121. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
122. If we take seriously Justice O'Connor's offhand remark in Rice v. Rehnar,
see supra note 77, there is yet a fifth exception based on the tribes' dependent
status: the ability to regulate liquor in Indian country.
123. See Brian J. Campbell, Comment, Tribal Power to Zone Nonmember Land
Within Reservations: The Uncertain Status of Retained Tribal Power over Nonmembers, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 779 n.90 (1989) (listing cases).
124. Iowa Mutual Insurance v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987) (emphasis
added) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)); Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 140 (1982) (emphasis added) (quoting United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)); see Campbell, supra note 123, at 778.
79 (discussing decisions).

451]

INDIAN LAW

487

vert to the general rule under which the power is upheld in the
face of congressional silence).
The reservation in Brendale was comprised of eighty percent trust land and twenty percent fee-patented land, both
Indian and non-Indian owned."2 Most of the fee-patented
land was incorporated in three towns in what was referred to
as the "open area" of the reservation, an area open to the general public. About fifty percent of the open area was comprised
of fee-patented land. The remaining fee-patented land was
scattered throughout the reservation in what was referred to as
the "closed area" of the reservation, an area generally closed
except to members of the tribe. The tribe's zoning ordinances
applied to all reservation lands, whether trust land or fee-patented land. The County of Yakima's zoning ordinances applied
to all land within the county except Indian trust lands. Thus,
there was an overlap of asserted jurisdiction with respect to
fee-patented lands within the reservation. Naturally, the ordinances differed in substance so that disagreements arose regarding which zoning ordinance applied to that land.
Brendale, a nonmember, wanted to develop a fee-patented
parcel of land in the closed area of the reservation, which contained very little fee-patented land. The development would
have complied with the county's ordinance but would have
violated the tribe's ordinance. Wilkinson, also a nonmember,
wanted to develop a fee-patented parcel of land in the open
area, in which the fee-patented land constituted about fifty
percent of the land. Once again, the development would have
complied with the county's ordinance but would have violated
the tribe's ordinance. Congress was-not surprisingly-absolutely silent with respect to the relative scope of authority of a state and tribe to regulate land use on a reservation. Presumptions would therefore once again be determinative.
The Court produced three opinions, none of which had
majority support. Justice White was joined by Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy. That opinion affirmed the
exclusive power of the state to zone the Wilkinson
property."2 Because Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
O'Connor, agreed in a second opinion that the state had the

125. The recitation of the facts following in the text is found at 492 U.S. at
414-19.
126. See id. at 432 (White, J.).
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exclusive authority to zone the Wilkinson property,'27 Justice
White's opinion announced the result in the Wilkinson case.
Neither opinion, however, directly analyzed the power of the
state to regulate in Indian country. Rather, each analyzed the
tribe's power to regulate this land and concluded that the tribe
had no such power. The implication was clear, then, that both
Justice White and Justice Stevens, as well as those who joined
these opinions, presumed state law otherwise to apply to this
category three case. 2 A conclusion that the tribe had power
to regulate the land would simply have been the affirmative
evidence that would have persuaded both Justice White and
Justice Stevens that the presumptively applicable state law
was preempted because both sets of laws, unlike in the tax
cases, could not apply concurrently.
The ability to regulate land use on the reservation surely
has a "direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,"'29 so long as one
views land use in its broad, generic sense. Yet, Justice White
refused to analyze the issue generically and thus refused to
concede that the tribal-interest test was met. He believed that
Montana required each particular proposed use of land to be
analyzed for its individual effect on the tribe: "[N]ot only would
regulatory authority depend in the first instance on a factual
inquiry into how a tribe's interests are affected by a particular
use of fee land, but as circumstances changed over time, so, too,
would the authority to zone." 3 ' Thus, Justice White concluded that this case fell under the exception to the general rule
that tribal power is retained unless explicitly divested by Congress and, therefore required evidence that Congress specifically delegated the power to zone the reservation land at issue.
Finding no such delegation, he determined that the tribe had
no such power, which in turn meant that the state's power was
not preempted.' 31
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, vehemently disagreed that the proper way to approach
the tribal-interest test was through a transaction-by-transac-

127.
128.
cases).
129.
130.
131.

See id. at 444-47 (Stevens, J.).
See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (defining "category three"
Montana v.. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 430 (White, J.).
Id. at 425-28.
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tion analysis, but his was a dissenting opinion in the Wilkinson
case.
It would be difficult to conceive of a power more central to
"the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe"
...

than the power to zone.... And how can anyone doubt

that a tribe's inability to zone substantial tracts of fee land
within its own reservation-tracts that are inextricably intermingled with reservation trust lands-would destroy the
tribe's ability to engage in the systematic and coordinated
utilization of land that is the very essence of zoning authority?
The threat to the tribe does not derive solely from the proposed uses of specific parcels of fee lands (which admittedly
would vary over time and place). The threat stems from the
loss of the general and longer-term advantages of comprehensive land management.132

The opinion by Justice Stevens rested on his view regarding the origins of tribal power rather than whether the Montana exception applied. Tribal power is not simply "inherent" in
his view. Rather, he views tribal power as resting on the historical power of tribes to exclude nonmembers from their lands.
The power to exclude, in his opinion, contains "the lesser power
to regulate."1" Once that power to exclude is dissipated
through demographic changes-even demographic changes
thrust upon tribes involuntarily-the tribal power is also dissipated."M In Brendale, he thus concluded that a transfer of

132. Id- at 458, 460 (Blackmun, J.) (citation omitted).
133. Id at 433 (Stevens, J.).
134. See id. at 436-37 (Stevens, J.). His dissent in Merrion, see supra note 87
and accompanying text, was premised, for example, on the fact that the tribe did
not condition entry onto the reservation to mine on the payment of a tribal severance tax. He thus concluded the tribe had no power, based on the power to exclude, to tax the nonmember miners that the tribe allowed to enter the reservation. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 159-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, for
the Merrion majority, strenuously disagreed. "The power does not derive solely
from the Indian tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands. Instead, it
derives from the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity
within its jurisdiction . . . ." 455 U.S. at 137.
Indeed, the dissent apparently views the tribal power to exclude, as well
as the derivative authority to tax, as merely the power possessed by any
individual landowner or any social group to attach conditions, including a
"tax" or fee, to the entry by a stranger onto private land or into the
social group, and not as a sovereign power.
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large tracts of land within a reservation to nonmembers under
the allotment policy involuntarily imposed on tribes in an earlier era would destroy the tribe's zoning power, whereas reservation land checkerboarded with only a few tracts of land owned
in fee by nonmembers would continue to be subject to tribal
authority, even if owned in fee by nonmembers. Because the
closed area contained relatively few nonmember-owned, feepatented parcels, tribal zoning of the closed area was proper in
his view, even if owned by a nonmember. Thus, Brendale's parcel, he reasoned, should be held to be outside the state's jurisdiction. Because Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall
and Brennan, agreed with this result, though for different
reasons, the state was held not to have jurisdiction over
Brendale's parcel. The Stevens opinion agreed with Justice
White's result with respect to the Wilkinson property because
that tract of land lies within the open area, which was owned
about fifty percent in fee by non-Indians.' 35
Because Justice Blackmun views tribal sovereignty as
inherent-a power that predated the arrival of the white man
and the creation of reservations from which Indians could exclude nonmembers and thus not based on the right to exclude
memorialized in any treaty-he would consider only whether
the Montana exception would apply to force the tribe to show a
delegation by Congress of the power to zone nonmember lands
on the reservation. As noted, 3 he believed the tribal-interest
test was satisfied, thus placing the case under the general rule
that the power is retained unless specifically divested. In the
face of congressional silence, the power would be upheld. Thus,
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall would have ruled
that the tribe had exclusive authority to zone both properties
while the state had no authority to zone in Indian country.137

Id. at 146.
135. How can tribes interpret the three Brendale opinions? Because Justices
White, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy would have opposed tribal zoning of any fee
land, while Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall would have permitted tribal
zoning of all reservation land, the opinion by Stevens will determine the extent to
which a tribe can zone reservation fee land. That opinion, in turn, depends on the
percentage of nonmember-owned fee land in a given area. If the percentage of fee
land owned by non-Indians is high enough (how high?), the tribe loses its power to
zone. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 476 (3d ed. 1991).
136. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
137. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 448-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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THE CRITIQUE

After Cotton Petroleum and Brendale and the presumptions
they memorialize, only one situation remains in which "there is
effectively a heavy presumption against the incursion of state
law into Indian country":1m the application of state law to
member Indians in Indian country (the category one case).'"
This fundamental shift in power from tribes to the states in
Indian country was accomplished through the common law in
an era in which the Court continues to claim that Congress
possesses plenary power to decide such questions and in which
the Indian policy of Congress is one of tribal autonomy, empowerment, and economic development. Writing two years before
Cotton Petroleum and Brendale, the optimistic Charles
Wilkinson opined: "[F]or all of its many flaws, the policy of the
United States toward its native people is one of the most progressive of any nation. This is particularly true of judge-made
law."14 The pendulum, however, has swung, at least in the
Supreme Court."'
Much more than the substantive outcomes, however,
should be questioned here. After wending one's way through
the rhetorical process used by the Court in creating the contours of tribal sovereignty, one is struck by the intrinsic weakness of that process itself and its resulting ill effects on the
development of substance. The Court first announces that the

138. See supra text accompanying note 64.

139. This rule seems safe at present. In 1993, the Court confirmed the
McClanahan rule that the wages and automobiles of Indians in Indian country are
not subject to state taxation. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 113 S.
Ct. 1985 (1993).
140. WILKINSON, supra note 36, at 5 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
141. In a seminal piece, historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., identified a 30year cycle in American politics and domestic policy.
[The cycles] are only fluctuations, rhythms, in the short-run politics of a
single country. They may foreshadow but do not control the shape of
things to come. Because the cycle is not a pendulum swinging between
fixed points but a spiral, it admits novelties and therefore escapes determinism (and confounds prophecy).
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American Politics, in ARTHUR M.
SCHLFSINGER, THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 30-31 (1986). The cyclical shifts
in American Indian policy have been more pronounced than the shifts in the general political landscape, and they have been just about as regular. It has now been
30 years since the dawn of the era of self-determination, see supra note 12, and
the pendulum appears to be swinging back again. Unlike previous pendulum
swings, however, this one seems to be originating with the Supreme Court rather
than with Congress.
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contours of tribal and state sovereignty in Indian country are
properly matters for Congress to decide. In analyzing the scope
of state power in Indian country, the Court then uses language
implying that Congress has indeed decided the matter-either
it has or has not "preempted" state power or "delegated" tribal
power-and thus the Court implies that it is doing nothing
more than giving voice to the rule articulated by Congress in
treaties and tangentially related statutes. Yet, cursory reading
of these opinions shows that there is no evidence one way or
another regarding whether Congress preempted state power or
delegated tribal power with respect to the particular matter at
issue. The Court creates law while hiding behind the rubric of
congressional preemption and delegation. Institutional responsibility for the substance of the outcome in Indian law is thus
masked. As Professor Rotenberg noted, "The Court based preemption on congressional 'non-law.' In lieu of law, the Court
relied on congressional policy. Once again, Congress received
credit or blame for actions that it had never taken when, in
fact, the Court was responsible for both the creation of the
policy and its implementation." ' The Court "hides behind
phantom decisions by others."' The process is institutionally
circular.
Moreover, through the use of shifting presumptions, the
common law is fundamentally altered without language indicating the fundamental shift in power from one sovereign to
another. Without overturning precedent, the Court has, in
Morgan's words, "changed the accepted rules of the common
law without the appearance of judicial legislation""' through
the facile use of presumptions. The means by which the law is
changed is an implicit shift in presumptions rather than an
explicit rejection of doctrine and the creation of new doctrine,
which allows the Court to effect significant shifts in sovereign
power in Indian country without having to explain and defend
the ultimate substantive position adopted.
Because the decisions are framed around the argument
technique described at length in this Essay-the argumentfrom-ignorance in the face of indeterminacy and the use of
presumptions to resolve the indeterminacy-the decisions are

142. Daniel L. Rotenberg, Congressional Silence in the Supreme Court, 47 U.
MiAMI L. REv. 375, 382 (1992).
143. Id. at 383.
144. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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filled with analysis of (nonexistent) congressional evidence of
intent rather than with reasoning that supports the case's
ultimate delineation of the spheres of state and tribal power,
respectively. Stated differently, the Court's rhetorical process
allows the Court to skirt the fundamental inquiry: What is
tribal sovereignty? The language in Williams v. Lee 4 ' held
the potential to allow the Court to grapple forthrightly with the
issue, taking responsibility for the definition of the term and
openly discussing the competing tensions underlying it. But the
Court replaced the sovereignty approach of Williams v. Lee
with the language of preemption, altering the dynamics of the
analysis in a manner inimical to a wise and rational decisionmaking process regarding the development of the definition of
tribal sovereignty.
What roles should the geographic boundaries of Indian
country, land ownership within Indian country, and tribal
membership play, respectively? How should the radically divergent circumstances of the various tribes affect the notion of
tribal sovereignty? The Navajo-on a reservation larger than
many states, with a population greater than many states, and
with a language and culture that has survived colonialism-is,
after all, worlds apart from the Mashantucket Pequot in
Ledyard, Connecticut.
How, if at all, should the power exercised by tribes in Indian country differ from the power exercised by the federal government or states in their respective geographical jurisdictions?
The limitations on tribal sovereignty based on membership and
property ownership (as opposed to reservation boundaries) are
limitations that are not imposed on the sovereignty of the
states or the federal government. 4 6 Perhaps the rules are
wise, perhaps they are not; yet, no defense or even discussion
of the resultant rules needs to be undertaken solely because of
the process adopted in arriving at these rules.How should the
differing views regarding the origin of tribal sovereignty affect
its scope today? Justice Stevens' conception of tribal sovereignty as originating in the power to exclude non-Indians from
reserved lands is worlds apart from Justice Blackmun's and
Justice Marshall's articulation of tribal sovereignty as an inherent power that allows regulation of economic activity re-

145. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
146. See Dussias, supra note 4, at 86-96.
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gardless of whether the tribe could exclude those regulated.
Yet, even these differing articulations are never front and center in these opinions, as they should be; they are merely backdrops, implied assumptions regarding tribal sovereignty that
are never analyzed or defended but rather merely announced.
Asking whether Congress has preempted the particular
state action at issue or whether it has delegated to tribes the
particular power at issue (if a majority of the Justices believe
the tribal power at issue is inconsistent with tribes' dependent
status) allows both Congress and the Court to avoid systematically and comprehensively defining tribal sovereignty as an
independent matter. Congress, which the Court insists has the
plenary power to define tribal sovereignty, is reactive only,
periodically passing a narrow statute addressing a single issue,
often to overturn or modify a Supreme Court decision ostensibly made in the name of preemption by Congress. 48 The disjointed process used by Congress and the Supreme Court
means that no systematic and enduring vision of tribal sovereignty can result. The word "power" in the title of this Essay
was thus intended to refer not only to the allocation of power
between states and tribes to regulate civil affairs in Indian
country but also to the balance of power between Congress and
the Supreme Court-and the resulting vacuum of power in
practice-in delineating that allocation.'49

147. See supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., supra note 20.
149. Exacerbating the problem described here is the anecdotal evidence suggesting that the Court and some commentators don't perceive Indian law to bo
very important or intellectually satisfying. That perception fuels the desire to avoid
dealing with the fundamental intellectual and political issues that are present in
defining tribal sovereignty. The present decision-making process successfully allows
both the Court and Congress to avoid entangling themselves in the larger question.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Where the Action Is: Congress, Not the Suprenme
Court, WALL ST. J., April 20, 1994, at A15 ("Where is the excitement and challenge in being a rubber stamp? How many cases of Indian jurisdiction and bankruptcy does George Mitchell want to handle?"). Even Justice Blackmun, a champion
of tribal sovereignty, has expressed similar themes.
Even the Justices themselves have been known to chafe at the grinding dullness of some of the opinions they are assigned to write.
"If one's in the doghouse with the Chief, he gets the crud," Justice
Harry A. Blackmun .. . said in a speech to a group of judges last summer. "He gets the tax cases, and some of the Indian cases, which I like
but rve had a lot of them."
"You know," the 78-year-old jurist added, "there are cases that are fun
to write. And there are cases that are not."
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The allocation of power between states and various
tribes-considered individually in their own dramatically divergent contexts 159-is political and should be resolved by Congress with the intimate involvement of the affected states and
tribes."' 1 I am not optimistic about that happening, however,
because of the nature of the Court's recent decisions in favor of
state sovereignty and to the detriment of tribal sovereignty and
the congressional inertia that arises both from those results
52
and from the absence of a large Indian constituency.'

Stuart Taylor, Jr., Reading the Tea Leaves of a New Term, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,
1986, at B14. Cf. Michael C. Blumm & Michael Cadigan, The Indian Court of
Appeals: A Modest Proposal to Eliminate Supreme Court Jurisdiction over Indian
Cases, 46 AK. L. REV. 203, 206-07 (advocating eliminating Supreme Court jurisdic.
tion over Indian law cases and vesting it in a new Indian Court of Appeals staffed
with "panels selected from interested circuit and district court judges ...
who are
interested in Indian cases and who think Indian law is an important subject of
federal law").
150. See Nell Jessup Newton, Let a Thousand Policy.Flowers Bloom: Making
Indian Policy in the Twenty-First Century, 46 ARK. L. REv. 25, 67 (1993) (disagreeing with the premise that it is appropriate to construct a "grand theory" or "unifled field theory" of Indian law). "As messy and difficult as it is, Congress must
deal with individual tribes, for it is with the tribes, and not a mythical large tribe
called 'Indian country' with which Congress has a political relationship.* Id. at 75.
See supra note 117 (discussing how the outcome in Oliphant, which denied the
right of a tribe to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, perhaps was
defensible for the particular tribe at issue but not defensible for such tribes as the
Navajo).
151. A more modest alternative if this proves too ambitious for Capitol Hill to
achieve would be for Congress to pass a general statute directing the courts to
interpret its silence in any given subject-matter area regarding the respective
spheres of state and tribal power in Indian country as meaning that state power is
preempted in favor of tribal power. If Congress disagrees with the outcome of any
particular case under such an approach, it could reverse it by specific legislation.
If the Court remains true to its approach of looking to congressional intent.
such a statute should stop the misuse of congressional silence by courts as indicative of congressional intent to bless state power over Indian country activities and
should produce substantive outcomes consistent with Congress's current Indian law
policy of self-determination in most instances. It should also produce a process
more consistent with Congress's current Indian law policy of self-determination
because it would require Congress to invoke the cumbersome process of legislation
only to narrow tribal sovereignty (by reversing a court decision that Congress feels
inappropriately expands it) rather than to expand tribal sovereignty (by overturning
decisions inconsistent with current policy, such as Brendale and Cotton Petroleum).
The Court's Brendale/Cotton Petroleum presumptions, in other words, would be
reversed by statute. Such a statute might be difficult for some members of Congress to support, however, in lieu of its open-ended and nonspecific nature.
152. "The current Indian population represents only 0.76% of the population of
the nation-a figure that leaves Indian demands for redressing the legacy of conquest a quiet whisper barely heard above the din of political debate about issues
affecting numerically greater proportions of the society.' Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law,
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An example illustrates the point. As Philip Frickey recognized, 5 ' the Court was perhaps at its pragmatic best in
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation." The Oneida
claimed that their ancestors transferred 100,000 acres to the
State of New York in 1795 in violation of federal law and thus
requested that their aboriginal title be confirmed and back rent
paid. Writing for five Justices, Justice Powell upheld the ability
of the tribe to pursue their claim free of such affirmative defenses as statutes of limitations and laches! Powell wrote that
the Court "recognized ...

the potential consequences of affir-

mance" 5 '

but that the Solicitor General noted that "Congress
has enacted legislation to extinguish Indian title and claims
related thereto in other eastern States, . . . and it could be

expected to do the same in New York should the occasion
arise."156 Powell concluded, 'We agree that this litigation
makes abundantly clear the necessity for congressional
action."' 7 The ball was punted to Congress, where it belongs,
through the medium of the Court's decision. Congress worked
with the states and the affected tribes in other eastern land
claims to arrive at equitable settlements agreed to by all. 158
Frickey observed:
As Chief Justice Marshall did, the Court expected Congress to
carry the burden of resolving the consequences of colonization,
even in the contemporary context-indeed, one might say,
especially in the contemporary context. John Marshall faced
situations in which the Court accommodated colonization by
necessity; no other entity was as well situated to rationalize
the underlying premises of colonization, such as original Indian title, the exclusive tribal-federal relationship, and the
sovereignty of tribes. Chief Justice Marshall's own
situatedness essentially required him to incorporate some
aspects of colonization into American public law. Today, however, it is difficult to see why the Court should give any special solicitude to arguments for expanding the influence of

46 ARK.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

L. REV. 77, 78 (1993).
Frickey, supra note 17, at 1235-37.
470 U.S. 226 (1985).
Id. at 253.
Id. (quoting Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae).
Id.

158. See, e.g., Maine Indians Claims Settlement Act of 1980, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1721-1735 (1988) (described in GETCHES, supra note 12, at 117).
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colonization, especially when Congress has authority to take
that perspective into account.'5 9

Unfortunately, the Court's repeated affirmance of state
power in Indian country will not likely pressure Congress into
acting, unlike the Court's decision in Oneida. The constituency
for independent congressional action rarely is strong
enough. 6 ' For that reason, the Court's decisions are doubly
troubling: They effectively usurp the legislative function in the
name of honoring legislative will. The change in common-law
presumptions described in this Essay is thus more insidious
than a similar change in presumptions regarding the allocation
of powers under the Constitution between the federal branches
of government, between the federal government and the states,
or between government and an individual, issues with respect
to which the Court is intended to be the ultimate arbiter. The
Court's repeated assertions that Congress, not the Court, has
plenary power in Indian law as well as the general admonition
that the Court should not engage in "judicial legislation"6 "
begin to ring hollow.

159. Frickey, supra note 17, at 1237.
160. But see supra note 20 (describing two instances in which Congress was
prompted to action in response to Supreme Court decisions). One such decision was
favorable to Indians and Congress essentially confirmed the decision with a more
precise regulatory framework; one was unfavorable to Indians and Congress simply
overturned it. These, however, are the exceptions that prove the rule. Recent Congresses have shown little concerted interest in Indian affairs. See Newton, supra
note 150, (describing and criticizing three recent legislative proposals).
161. Just a few of the dozens of non-Indian law opinions denigrating 'judicial
legislation" in the past two decades include: Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129,
147 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting); Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S.
365, 397 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931,
966 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 841-42
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United
States, 471 U.S. 48, 77-78 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Federal Election Comm'n
v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 507 (1985) (White,
J., dissenting); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 586 n.16 (1982)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 227 n.7 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Columbus Bd. of Ed. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 483-84
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 598-99 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373-74
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 709 (1975)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
The number of the above-cited opinions written by Justice Stevens is ironic in
view of his leadership role in switching the Indian law presumptions in 1989 in a
way inimical to both current congressional policy and to a long list of common-law
precedent.

